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The Politics of Law and the Laws of Politics:
The Political Paradoxes of Transnational
Constitutionalism
PABLO HOLMES*
ABSTRACT

This essay addresses the ongoing debate on transnational
constitutionalism and the theoretical assumptions related to the
possibilities of internal politicization of transnationalgovernance. After
reconstructing the debate on the transnationalizationof law and the
emergence of fragmented forms of transnational governance, I engage
with the description of emerging forms of constitutional law within the
fragmented legal regimes of global governance.After doing that, I explore
the assumption exposed by some legal scholars, which insists on the
possibility of an internal politicization of legal discourse as a way to
challenge the so-called "rule of experts" in transnationallaw. Drawing
on the social-theoretical and political-philosophical formulations of
Claude Lefort, I will then address what I call the social conditions of the
politicizationof law. My claim is that the very possibility of carrying out
a certain politics of law depends on features, typical of the political
constitutionalization of law, which do not seem to be present in
transnationalgovernance.
INTRODUCTION

Ubi societas, ibi jus: where there is society, there must also be law.
This meaning of Ulpiano's famous quote, which students are used to
hearing during their first months of law school, refers to the fact that
any form of society needs some kind of social norms to hold it together.
* Pablo Holmes is an assistant professor at the Institute of Political Science of the
University of Brasilia, Brazil. He has a law degree and a master of law from the Federal
University of Pernambuco and a PhD in sociology from the University of Flensburg,
Germany. He published "Verfassungsevolution in der Weltgesellschaft," at Nomos
Publishing, from Baden-Baden, among other articles in scientific journals in Latin
America and Europe.
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Hence, if we live today in an increasingly transnational world society in
which social forms of interaction and communication in different social
sectors such as the economy, science, sports, and mass communication
no longer seem to operate exclusively limited by the political boundaries
conformed by the territorial jurisdiction of national legal orders,' that
famous dictum should hold true on this level. 2 Transnational law seems
to be in an evolutionary demand for a transnational world society.
Moreover, from a sociological perspective, one can say that the
complexity of a given society is decisive in determining the complexity of
its legal system. 3 It does not mean that society evolves in a steady
course of improvements toward development or "civilization." Rather, it
means that social complexity on the basal level must correspond to some
social structures that deal with similar complexity on the normative
level, such as a system of rules. In the case of a transnationalizing world
society, it is not difficult to identify the emergence of broad processes of
juridification in the last two or three decades. These processes are not
only extremely complex, but also correspond to the growing atopical
character of social communication on a global level. Meanwhile, these
mechanisms have become one of the most important objects of studies in
different fields of scholarly investigation.
Considering the observation that emerging forms of law operate
beyond the borders of nation-states, we must also have in mind another
implication of this fact. The implication is grounded in common
knowledge that every lawyer bears in mind when dealing with practical
legal matters, even if not consciously. It can be formulated as a
complementary dictum to the former: Where there is law, there must also

be some kind of legal framework of second order in which legal
decisionmaking takes place.
The practical knowledge implied in this assumption states that a
social norm can only have legal value if it is possible to assert whether
or not it might be considered valid within a particular legal order. 4 In

1. See LUDGER PRIES, DIE TRANSNATIONALISIERUNG DER SOZIALEN WELT [THE
TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF THE SOCIAL WORLD] 9-47 (2008) (Ger.) (providing a discussion
of the transnationalization of society). See also John W. Meyer, Globalization:Sources and
Effects on National States and Societies, 15 INT'L Soc. 233 (2000); Saskia Sassen, Territory

and Territorialityin the Global Economy, 15 INT'L Soc. 372 (2000).
2. ANDREAS FISCHER-LEScANO, GLOBALVERFASSUNG: DIE GELTUNGSBEGRONDUNG
DER MENSCHENRECHTE [GLOBAL CONSTITUTION: THE JUSTIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS]

67-98 (2005) (Ger.).
3. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 147-155 (Fatima Kastner et al.
eds., Klaus A. Ziegert trans., 2004) (1993).
4. See id. at 98-108. See also Ralf Christensen & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Die

Einheit der Rechtsordnung: Zur Funktionsweise der holistischen Semantik [THE UNITY OF
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the legal theoretical tradition some have called attention to the
existence of rules of recognition,5 which indicate the last grounds of
validity of norms in a given system. Others have pointed out the logical
necessity of supposing the existence of a grounding rule (Grundnorm),
which would furnish other legal norms with derivate validity.6 Within
contemporary legal theory, this sort of explanation for legal validity,
which resorts to logical, factual, or moral forms of legitimacy, does not
appear to be useful or necessary anymore. Instead of trying to suppose
theoretical foundations, legal theory looks for the positive legal
foundations of validity in the legal system itself, namely in the internal
conditions set by a pool of constitutional rules that regulate legal
competencies and the material limits of normative power.
Accordingly, a theoretical discourse has gradually emerged about
the existence of transnational legal orders functioning within their own
internal constitutional frameworks. By constitutional framework, here,
I mean of course not the political arrangement of democratic
constitutionalism, but the existence of some kind of second-order law or
legal rules, which register within the transnational legal order the
problem of legal reflexivity. By conceiving the existence of some
constitutional legal framework beyond the existence of political
constitutions, I follow to a great extent the thread left by Giinther
Teubner and David Sciulli. 7 The controversial claims around this point
will be addressed later on in this essay. With regard to global and
transnational law, this claim would imply the following: If global lawwhich transcends the boundaries of the territorially-segmented political
system of a world society-exists, then a constitutional framework from
which it is possible to derive a set of criteria for determining whether a
legal norm is valid must also exist. At least we should speak about
constitutional problems emerging where the existence of political
constitutions of nation-states can no longer bind legal communication to

THE LEGAL ORDER: THE FUNCTIONALITY OF THE HOLISTIC SEMANTICS], 4 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 8, 8-14 (2006) (Ger.).
5. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF THE LAW 92 (4th prtg. 1967).
6. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 193-95 (Max Knight trans., 1967) (1934).
7. See generally DAVID SCIULLI, THEORY OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM:
FOUNDATIONS OF A NON-MARXIST CRITICAL THEORY (1992) (explaining the rationale,
reasoning, and background underlying societal constitutionalism); GUNTHER TEUBNER,
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION (Gareth

Norbury trans., 2012) (exploring the function of constitutionalism-both within nationstates and societally in general-in a transnational society); Gunther Teubner, Societal
Constitutionalism: Alternatives
to
State-Centred Constitutional Theory?, in
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3 (Christian Joerges et al. eds.,
2004) [Hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE] (presenting trends of development and
the features that must be present in societal constitutionalism).
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political democratic processes.8 As we are going to see, the emerging
debate on transnational constitutionalism that now has been prevalent
for more than a decade points to nondemocratic forms of legal reflexivity
that seem to create legal orders beyond the state. 9
In what follows, I will attempt to deal with the problem of legal
transnationalization as an emerging social phenomenon that .puts
different forms of constitutional discourses at stake. For many scholars,
constitutional discourse is crucial for politically framing legal decision
making on a transnational level. Accordingly, the political outcomes of
legal decisions on this level are partially determined by the set of
constitutional principles or by the "constitutional mindset"1 0 operating
in a given legal system." Hence, the possibilities of politicization of
global governance are limited to the question of which constitutional
discourse would be hegemonic in each regime at a given time. New
constitutional methodologies or discourses could then be useful for

8. MARCELO NEVES, TRANSCONSTITUTIoNALIsM 2 (Kevin Mundy trans., 2013) (2009).
9. For more than ten years, there has been an ongoing theoretical discussion about
constitutional pluralism. This debate certainly began in Europe, following the process of
"legal Europeanization," which was politically decided by the nation states. After the
drafting of the first seminal papers on constitutional pluralism, which focused mainly on
the multiplicity of legal orders with different levels of jurisdiction, this debate became
more and more related to the parallel discussion on the fragmentation of international
law. Further, the increasing attention given to the growing tendency of legalization of
transnational social processes in the field of international relations enriched this debate.
In recent years, transnational and global constitutionalism became more than wishful
thinking--constituting a field of study, which is not necessarily guided by normative
assumptions of political democracy. After many symposia, books, theses, and even
autonomous journals (like Global Constitutionalism published by Cambridge University
Press) the discussion about transnational forms of constitutionalization has clearly
become a debate focused on the problems of global governance, beyond the institutional
framework of the nation state. See generally TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 7
(collecting and discussing the "normative and theoretical foundations of the law governing
relations between citizens"). See also id. at 3; Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making
of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981) (presenting an early NorthAmerican account of the issue); Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65
MOD. L. REV. 317 (2002) (proposing a "rehabilitated" language of constitutionalism);

Christian Walter, Constitutionalizing (Inter)national Governance: Possibilities for and
Limits to the Development of an InternationalConstitutional Law, 44 GER. Y.B. INT'L L.
170 (2001)

10. See Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian
Themes About InternationalLaw and Globalization,8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 9 (2006)
(describing a view of constitutionalism as a mindset rather than the traditional use of
constitutional vocabulary).
11. See, e.g., Sonja Buckel & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Gramsci Reconsidered:
Hegemony in Global Law, 22 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 437, 448 (2009) (describing a "hegemonic
law" wherein the constitutional mindset is formed under particular social conditions of the
"historical bloc" and other social praxes).
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courts in their task of coping with social problems on a transnational
level.
These assumptions have many legal and political theoretical
implications. They seem to assume that, given that national politics can
no longer deal with a great part of the regulatory problems arising from
the new waves of transnationalization, internal politicization of global
legal regimes could replace national, state-centered political struggles
and the functions they have performed for national societies. Law could
then be the last terrain of social process politicization either in the form
of struggles for hegemony or a "quasi-scientific" legal reasoning over
social demands on the social adequacy of law.
This essay challenges the assumption that the politics of law is a
social achievement that can be taken for granted as a consequence of
the mere existence of a legal system. To do that, I address the following
questions: Is it possible to politicize transnational and international law
from within, relying exclusively on different legal or constitutional
mind-sets? Can the "political dimension" of transnational
constitutionalism replace political constitutionalism as it was known in
the nation-state? After reconstructing the general lines of what can be

called a new transnational constitutionalism, I will draw on a socialtheoretical reflection on the work of Claude Lefort. I will thus argue
that any internal politicization of transnational law must be grounded
in institutional structures that must be functionally equivalent to what
is commonly known as the political arrangement of democratic
constitutionalism. This is necessary if transnational law is to provide

social and political inclusion, as intended by the political constitutional
order of the so-called Keynesian-Westphalian State.
I. LEGAL TRANSNATIONALIZATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: NEW

FORMS OF REGULATION
Anyone who attempts to understand how emerging transnational
forms of regulation operate must look beyond the highly simplified
vocabulary of state-centered realism--common in the in fields of
international relations and political science-and pay attention to the
interlocking relationship between law and different sectors of world
society. Global regimes of governance resemble a "disparate disorder" of
organizations, institutions, and jurisdictions that are in more

disagreement than the structured outcomes of rational decisionmaking
led by nation-states.12 Descriptions that depict global governance as the
12. ANDREAS FISCHER-LESCANO & GUNTHER TEUBNER, REGIME-KOLLISIONEN: ZUR
FRAGMENTIERUNG DES GLOBALEN RECHTS 19 (2006) (Ger.).
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result of hegemonic or homogeneous blocks of political power
represented by states are barely able to describe the complexity of a
post-national constellation and the pluralism of the transnational
regulatory dynamic.1 3
To this extent, the scholarly debate on the legalization of global
policy regimes1 4 points to important developments in the evolution of
global law and its relations with the emerging forms of governance, even
if it also remains partially attached to certain theoretical prejudices of
neoclassical economics. 15 Yet, the most prolific reflections on the
emergence of global legal regimes are still produced by those following
the theoretical legal thread left by Philip Jessup in 1956. In Jessup's
striking definition, legal theory should use "instead of 'international
law,' the term 'transnational law' to include all law which regulates
actions or events that transcend national frontiers," whether involving
state or nonstate actors. 16 Transnational law should include "both public
and private international law," as well as "other rules which do not
wholly fit into such standard categories."17 In contrast to
"international," which refers to phenomena taking place "between"
states, the use of the word "transnational" for designating these
emerging legal regimes refers to phenomena taking place "beyond,"
"across," or "through" states.18
Indeed, as the regulatory power of the state becomes more and more
relativized, more room is left to social organizations such as
corporations, universities, sports federations, and information networks
for producing their own forms of social regulation.19 From the
standpoint of legal realism and legal pluralism, the intuition that
society produces legal mechanisms and social forms of regulation that

13. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 56-58 (1984).
14. See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401
(2000).
15. PABLO HOLMES,
VERFASSUNGSEVOLUTION
IN DER WELTGESELLSCHAFT:
DIFFERENZIERUNGSPROBLEME DES RECHTS UND DER POLITIK IM ZEITALTER DER GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE [CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION IN THE WORLD SOCIETY: PROBLEMS OF
DIFFERENTIATION OF LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE] 182-83
(2013) (Ger.).
16. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAw 2 (1956).
17. See id. at 2.
18. See Craig Scott, "TransnationalLaw" as Proto-Concept: Three Conceptions, 10 GER.
L.J. 859, 866 (2009).
19. See Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private
Authority in the International System, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3, 3-10 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002).
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go wide beyond "state law" is not new. 20 Yet, the "living law" (lebendes
Recht)21 of society seems to gain new autonomy thanks to the radical
process of transnationalization. A careful observation of the regulatory
dynamics in today's world society should demonstrate that
transnational governance is in many ways influenced by societal
processes of regulation, which are explicitly in concurrence with
national and international political processes of state lawmaking.
Through informal, and sometimes not clearly legal-even though
also not clearly illegal-mechanisms, big business is able to translate its
interests into the language of public regulation in numerous ways. 22
Although this phenomenon is arguably not new, the amplitude of its
influence has never been as considerable as in the last decades. 23
Moreover, assigning the cause of this shift solely to "neoliberal
hegemony in economic thought" would be nothing but a hasty
politicization of theoretical analysis. 24 Rather, one should look at the
roots of these processes, which clearly rely on the economic and
institutional transformations brought with the intensification of
economic transnationalization. Consequently, firms, as well as other
transnational and supranational organizations, can pressure state
agents and political bodies by means of blackmailing and forum (and
regime) shopping. 25 Even more interestingly, the cases of informal
networks of governance, such as those gravitating around the Basel

20. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: "Things Ain't
What They Used to Be", 2005 Wis. L. REV. 365; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Law of
the Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction of Legality in Pasargada,12 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 5 (1977).
21. See EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAw 81
(1936).
22. See SOL PICCiorTo, REGULATING GLOBAL CORPORATE CAPITALISM, 165-71 (2012);
Colin Crouch, The Global Firm: The Problem of the Giant Firm in Democratic Capitalism,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 148, 161-68 (David Coen et al.
eds., 2010).
23. See Deniz Igan et al., A Fistful of Dollars:Lobbying and the FinancialCrisis 6 (Int'l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 287, 2009), available at http://www.imf.orglexternall
pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09287.pdf (pointing out political lobbying as one of the major causes of
the market instability that led to financial crisis of 2008, and providing "suggestive
evidence that the political influence of the financial industry might have the potential to
have an impact on financial stability"). See also Joseph Schumpeter, Cronies and Capitols:
Businesspeople Have Become Too Influential in Government, ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 2013.
24. See COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM 1-23 (2011).
25. See Colin Crouch, Modelling the Firm in its Market and Organizational
Environment: Methodologies for Studying Corporate Social Responsibility, 27 ORG. STUD.
1533, 1545 (2006).

560

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 21:2

Committee, are in a position to deeply affect state policy on a national
level. 26
Besides that, one can hardly deny that, in the last decades,
supranational organizations such as the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World Bank, the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as
well as regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries or even
private sports organizations such as the International Association of
Federation Football (FIFA) or the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS),
have developed clearly differentiated legal processes beyond their role
as mere policy consultants. Supranational law can influence, limit, and
bind national sovereignty in many ways with respect to different issues
such as taxation, international commerce, and environmental
legislation. 27 Moreover, in the last decades, several supranational legal
institutions have developed features that were typical of the national
legal systems-namely, the establishment of courts, procedural rules,
and legislation. 28 Nevertheless, these mechanisms are hardly subject to
any form of sovereign statehood. And it was exactly this fact that led
some authors to see them as a part of a world-statehood in the
making. 29
Two other forms of nonstate legal regulation are also worth
mentioning. Both are primarily grounded in the so-called spontaneous
field of private market economic and corporate practices. The highly
sophisticated legal structures of lex mercatoria have gained great
importance in the last decades. 30 Partly, this philosophy has been
reinforced by states that "relaxed their conditions for enforcing private
26. See Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented
States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 1014, 1040-41
(1997).
27. See PIccIOTro, supranote 22, at 50-53.
28. See Poul F. Kjaer, Law and Order Within and Beyond National Configurations, in
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNCTIONAL

DIFFERENTIATION, 395, 395-402 (Poul F. Kjaer et al. eds., 2011).
29. See Mathias Albert, Einleitung: Weltstaat und Weltstaatlichkeit: Neubestimmungen
des Politischen in der Weltgesellschaft [INTRODUCTION: WORLD STATE AND WORLD
STATEHOOD: NEW DERTEMINATIONS OF THE POLITICAL IN THE WORLD SOCIETY], in
WELTSTAAT UND WELTSTAATLICHKEIT: BEOBACHTUNGEN GLOBALER POLITISCHER
STRUKTURBILDUNG [WORLD STATE AND WORLD STATEHOOD: OBSERVATIONS OF THE
FORMATION OF GLOBAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES ] 9 (Mathias Albert & Rudolf Stichweh
eds., 2007) (Ger.).

30. See, e.g., Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives-and Faces-of Lex Mercatoria:
History as Genealogy in InternationalBusiness Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
2008, at 1G9; Peter Mazzacano, The Lex Mercatoria as Autonomous Law, 4 COMP. RES. L.
& POL. ECON. 1 (2008).
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arbitration agreements, procedures and awards."31 Through various
mechanisms of legal management, the contract law of corporations was
in ather position of building internal mechanisms of normative
hierarchization, making possible problem solving exclusively based on
contracts without reliance on state legislation. Moreover, private
lawyers or courts increasingly externalize disputes about contractual
agreements to arbitration proceedings. 32 Another important type of
nonstate transnational rule concerns the internal governance practices
of corporations. OAdministered centrally and from within inter-firm
networks, transterritorialized globe spanning company activities bring
together a multitude of autonomous organizational and economic actors
that can easily exhaust the traditional regulatory aspirations of nation
states and other political bodies." 33 The emergence of, an "ever more
expanding body of self-regulatory rules" makes it gradually more
difficult to draw any lines "between official law and non-official law,
between hard and soft law, ,ultimately between law and non-law." 34
Transnational corporations very often develop "internal ordering and
mechanisms which aim to ensure their ability to transplant meaning
components, such as products, capital and human resources into a
whole range of different configurational settings."35
The expansion of the regulatory powers of inter-, supra-, and
transnational organizations has been largely facilitated in the last three
decades. On the one hand, the political decisions of the states regarding
economic and commercial integration have led to the emergence of new
forms of internationalized governance. 36 On the other hand, the
emergence of new instruments of global governance has developed a
legal dimension of its own, setting free the expansive dynamic of
functional social sectors that are not limited by political or territorial
boundaries.

31. See PICCIOTTO, supra note 22, at 57.
32. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society,
in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT ASTATE 3, 16-17 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
33. Peer Zumbansen, TransnationalLaw, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 738, 742 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006) (U.K.).
34. Id. at 742-43.
35. Kjaer, supra note 28, at 421.
36. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, Governance in a Partially Globalized World, in POWER
AND GOVERNANCE IN A PARTIALLY GLOBALIZED WORLD 245 (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 2002).
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II. TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: FUNCTIONAL SOCIAL ORDERING
BEYOND THE STATE

Problems regarding the structures of global governance are no
longer a matter solely of interest to diplomats, international lawyers, or
public regulators. In the twenty-first century, problems of everyday life
increasingly appear to be connected to global and transnational issues. 37
Transnational corporations violate human rights in different countries
while producing computers or tennis shoes; 38 the WTO makes decisions
concerning the use of genetically modified organisms (GMO) that
endanger the environment in remote localities in Latin America or in
big cities in Europe. 39 And the consciousness about these processes and
causal connections becomes known through the mass media.
Admittedly, a broad array of global problems and decisions of global
forums are experienced only locally and have a clearly political and even
constitutional quality. These problems and decisions concern not only
state policies, but also civil, political, and social rights, which are
continuously challenged by private transnational actors and regulators.
Various authors and commentators have described an increasing
process of legalization taking place within global structures of
governance on the transnational level. These processes have been
described "as involving a fragmentation, hollowing-out, disaggregation,
or decentring of the state," entailing a "devolution of specific functions
to specialized regulators accompanied by new types of public-private
interactions."40 The very idea that there is a global legal system in the
making breaks with the traditional framework of constitutional theory,
namely the two core ideas of national law: the territoriality and the
unity of the legal system.

37. See David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, in RULING THE WORLD?:
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 37, 37-40 (Jeffrey

L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
38. See generally Cksar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, Global Governance and Labor rights:
Codes of Conduct and Anti-Sweatshop Struggles in Global Apparel Factories, 33 POL. &
Soc'Y 203 (2005) (describing working conditions in apparel factories in Mexico and
Guatemala).
39. This issue is certainly extremely controversial. There is particular concern about
the social, cultural and ecological impacts of GMO on the local level, especially in less
developed countries. See, e.g., MARIE LUSSER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS CO-ORGANISED BY JRC-IPTS AND

FAO (2012), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/015/ap016e/ap016e.pdf; Panel Report,
European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products,WT/291/R, WT/DS292/R, & WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006).
40. See Sol Picciotto, ConstitutionalizingMultilevel Governance?, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L.
457, 457-58 (2008).
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Indeed, legal and political theories have always been especially
concerned with territorial boundaries of legal and policy regimes;
specifically, the problem of jurisdiction. This was the core of
constitutional theory and the legal and political reflection of the
"Keynesian-Westphalian paradigm." 41 But it is exactly this "grid of clear
borders" between regimes that has been challenged by the process of
social and legal transnationalization. 42 The most striking consequence is
that, today, there is no "sovereigntist order of orders" or political metaprinciple of authority toward which we can orientate the analysis on the
transnational level. 43 Specifically, we can no longer take for granted
that courts and political authorities relate to each other only on the
basis of hierarchical (if internal to a domestic order) or horizontal
mechanisms with clear territorial boundaries delimitating their
jurisdictions. Rather, several forms of supra-, trans- and infranational
laws "have created complex interactions between a variety of
adjudicative and regulatory bodies at different levels" 44 involving both
competition and coordination among them. As always, the relevant
interpretative assumptions legal professionals have to deal with concern
"the contextually appropriate choice of law rules," although
transnational rules do not stand above the systems to which they
apply. 45 Instead, they are mostly formulated or interpreted "in the
context of their own system" 4 6 in deference to and under the selfvalidating terms of their own orders. Thus, legally pluralistic
explanations fit very well with the new global order of multiple
transnational regimes and political layers in which we live.
Looking at the interactions of national, international, and
transnational law is productive because it reveals how world society is
structured not only around political organizations (like the state), but
along functional structures operating globally across boundaries. 47 The
description of an increasing fragmentation that has dominated the
debate over global governance regimes in past years, far from being only

41. Nancy Fraser, Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World, 36 NEw LEFT REV. 1, 1
(2005).
42. See, e.g., MORITz RENNER, ZWINGENDES TRANSNATIONALES RECHT. ZUR STRUKTUR
DER WIRTSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG JENSEITS DES STAATES [MANDATORY TRANSNATIONAL LAW.
ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION BEYOND THE STATE] 91-168 (2011)

(Ger.) (for examples of the mandatory dimension of transnational legal orders).
43. See Neil Walker, Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global
Disorder of Normative Orders, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 373, 376 (2008).
44. Picciotto, supra note 40, at 461.
45. Walker, supra note 43, at 377.
46. Id.
47. Peer Zumbansen, Comparative, Global and Transnational Constitutionalism:The
Emergence of a TransnationalLegal-PluralistOrder, 1 GLOBAL CONST. 16, 25 (2012).
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a fashionable reference to post-modernist tendencies, 48 arose from the
very structures of world society set free by its process of
transnationalization. It corresponds to the increasing processes of
differentiation, which states are not able to prevent, that are driven by
the growing self-referent dynamics of economy, science, culture, health,
transport, and sports in a global society. 49 The legal limits of the global
legal regimes are therefore formed "by invisible colleges, invisible
markets and branches, invisible professional communities, invisible
social networks that transcend territorial boundaries."50 And the
sources of legal norms in these regimes are the self-organized processes
of highly specialized functional sectors. Indeed, prominent lawyers have
observed this phenomenon from their privileged positions for
observation of evolutionary trends in international law. 5 1 As Martti
Koskenniemi poses it:
Specializations such as 'trade law', 'human rights law',
'environmental law', 'criminal law', 'security law',
'European law' and so on started to reverse established
legal hierarchies in favour of the structural bias in the
relevant functional expertise. Even though this process
was
often organised through intergovernmental
organisations, the governmental delegations were
composed of technical (economic, environmental, legal)
experts in a way that transposed the functional
differentiation at the national level onto the
international plane.52
If legal pluralism under the Keynesian-Westphalian framework of
(state-centered) constitutional orders was just an external pressure for
national legal systems, "[u]nder the new order, pluralism is internalwritten into the emergent frame[work] itself."5 3 It becomes part of the

48. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, Legal Fragmentation(s):An Essay on Fluidity and Form, in
SOZIOLOGISCHE JURISPRUDENZ: FESTSCHRIFT FUR GUNTHER TEUBNER ZUM 65.
GEBURTSTAG [SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE. COMMEMORATIVE PUBLICATION IN HONOR
OF GUNTHER TEUBNER'S 65TH BIRTHDAY] 795, 795-97 (2009) (Ger.).
49. FISCHER-LESCANO & TEUBNER, supra note 12, at 19.
50. TEUBNER, supra note 32, at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Study Group of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11,
2006, J 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682; GAOR, 60th Sess. (Apr. 13, 2006).
52. Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of InternationalPublic Law: Between Technique and
Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (citations omitted).
53. Neil Walker, Taking ConstitutionalismBeyond the State, 56 POL. STUD. 519, 539

(2008).

THE POLITICS OF LAW AND THE LAWS OF POLITICS

565

very understanding of legal constitutionalism, 54 and, therefore, it makes
transnational constitutionalism, from the outset, a sort of
constitutional pluralism.'5 5 Accordingly, in order to offer an adequate
description of contemporary legal orders, pluralist constitutionalism (as
a description of the operating conditions of the legal system) must take
into account the disorder among the boundaries of hierarchicallegal
regimes.56
Regardless of how exotic the idea of pluralist constitutional orders
may be for many lawyers or political scientists operating on a national
level, it can be made plausible with a few theoretical steps. If we depart
from some basic assumptions of classical legal theory, it becomes clear
that some kind of constitutional discourse must exist as soon as a legal
order acquires a level of autonomy. Indeed, a legal regime can only exist
autonomously if it is based on some sort of second-order organization of
its scope and operation. In other words, it must dispose not only of rules
addressed to human behavior itself, but also of rules regulating the
validity of such rules.57 It must be so, since the validity of a rule cannot
be justified within a legal system on the basis of external grounds or
arguments. And this condition-the very condition of legal
differentiation-must remain as long as law operates as a normative
order in its own right.
Theories about the sources of law (Rechtsquellen) aim to solve
exactly this problem by referring to second order dispositions that define
the legal criteria a decision maker, such as a judge, must rely on when
deciding the validity of a legal rule.58 Legal sources of last resort may be
interpreted as natural law grounded in God's revelation or in reasonthe people, or even the people's spirit (Volksgeist), as it has been the
case in its romantic and idealistic versions.59 Nevertheless, this kind of
last foundation to legal validity has gradually become implausible in the
context of modern legal theory, which is arbitrary, metaphysical, or
traditional. Instead, this kind of legal validity has been replaced by the

54. Alexander Somek, The Constituent Power in National and TransnationalContext

32-34 (Univ. Iowa Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 12-35, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2172054.
55. See Walker, supra note 9, at 317; See TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 7,
at 5-7.
56. Walker, supra note 9, at 337-38.
57. See id. at 342. See also Niklas Luhmann, Verfassung als Evolutionire
Errungenschaft [CONSTITUTION AS A EVOLUTIONARY ACHIEVEMENT], 9 RECHTSHISTORISCHES

J. [RJ] 176, 184 (1990) (Ger.).
58. Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Globalverfassung: Verfassung der Weltgesellschaft
[GLOBAL CONSTITUTION: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD SOCIETY], 88 ARCHIV FOR
RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 349, 354 (2002) (Ger.).
59. See FREDERICK BEISER, HEGEL 239-43 (Brian Leiter ed., 2005).
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assumption that the foundation of a legal rule can only be another legal
rule.60 Therefore, legal validity has become a question of observing the
legal system itself, namely legal rules of second order that define
whether a certain rule fulfils formal (e.g., competences of initiative,
administrative, or legislative procedures) and material (e.g., compliance
with normative dispositions on human rights) conditions of validity.
Distribution of legislative competencies and adjudicative competencies
(Kompetenz-Kompetenz) were to be understood in this context as the
"constitutionin the material sense."6 1
Certainly, constitutions have long been thought of as the result of a
political decision that can only be ascribed to a delimitated polity. 62
Following Carl Schmitt, constitutions have been referred to as an
expression of the political unity derived from the very concept of
sovereignty. The latter, for its turn, should be conceptualized as the
sovereign's power "to decide on the state of exception."63 In this context,
the state as the political entity par excellence, has been seen as the only
bearer of a politicalself-identity able to be endowed with sovereignty. 64
Under the new transnational constellation there are nevertheless
regulatory processes making use of legal mechanisms without a state
quality. Therefore, some questions arise as soon as we observe this
global (dis)order of legal regimes. How should political and legal theory
conceive of the legitimacy and legal validity of regulatory processes such
as those of the European Union and its "comitology system," which
enjoys a broad range of powers that cannot be directly derived from
clear delegation by national political decisions? 65 How should we
conceive of the regulatory powers of private authorities in realms such
as the cyberspace of the Internet, where decisions regarding disputes
over IP addresses are made by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) without oversight by national or
60. See Luhmann, supra note 57, at 185.
61. See, e.g., KELSEN, supra note 6, at 222 (emphasis added).
62. See Somek, supranote 54, at 1, 6-9; Walker, supranote 53, at 527-29.
63. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 5-15 (George Schwab trans., 1985) (emphasis added) (defining sovereignty);
see also ERNST-WOLFGANG BOCKENFORDE, RECHT, STAAT, FREIHEIT: STUDIEN ZUR
RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE, STAATSTHEORIE UND VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE [LAW, STATE,
FREEDOM: STUDIES ON PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, THEORY OF THE STATE AND CONSITUTIONAL
HISTORY] 344-66 (1991) (Ger.).
64. See CHRISTOPH MOELLERS, STAAT ALS ARGUMENT [THE STATE AS AN ARGUMENT]
256-71 (2000); see also Hans Lindahl, Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards
an Ontology of Collective Selfhood, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT
POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 9, 9-17 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2008).
65. See Christian Joerges & Jirgen Neyer, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to
Deliberative PoliticalProcesses: The Constitutionalisationof Comitology, 3 EUR. L.J. 273,
282 (1997).
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international state-based jurisdictions? 66
How can the legal
decisionmaking of the WTO, whose court decisions often have a crucial
impact on issues like human rights, income distribution, and
environmental problems, be conceived even if its powers were to be
limited to trade-related issues? 67
If we consider constitutional law as a sort of reflexive law operating
within law and if we take the transnational movements toward the
legalization of regulatory processes seriously, we must agree with the
fact that there are already different forms of constitutional law at work
in today's global processes of regulation, which are not of the same
quality as national constitutional law. Transnational constitutional law
assumes a highly pluralistic form in each of the fragmented legal
regimes that compose the functionally differentiated structures of global
governance. These regimes function as atopical transnational polities,68
which in no way can be called political in the same way states can.
Within these regimes, constitutional norms refer not to political
processes such as parliamentary decisionmaking or political conflicts
between parties and elections, but to the specialized knowledge of a
specific functional social sector.69 The trade regime has, for instance, its
own primary and secondary norms, as well as its own adjudicative
structures. And although its decisions can have relevant consequences
for issues like labor rights, social inequality, access to medical
treatment, and knowledge, 70 they are formulated and expressed mainly
in the language of trade law, usually with its narrow and highly
naturalized understanding of private property rights.7 1 Yet, functional
constitutional law is not limited to supra-, trans-, or international

66. TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supranote 7, at 5-6.
67. See William Magnuson, WTO Jurisprudence& Its Critiques: The Appellate Body's
Anti-Constitutional Resistance, 51 HARv. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 121 (2010) (presenting the
arguments that the WTO's Appellate Body does not function in the most effective way due
to resistance in constitutionalization); Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO,
17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 623 (2006) (discussing the constitution of the WTO in relation to
various dimensions of typical constitutions).
68. HELMUT WILLKE, ATOPIA: STUDIEN ZUR ATOPISCHEN GESELLSCHAFT [ATOPIA:
STUDIES ON THE ATOPIC SOCIETY] 107-23 (2001) (Ger.).
69. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentationof Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999,
1014-17 (Michelle Everson trans., 2004).
70. See generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitutionand Human Rights,
3 J. INT'L EcON. L. 19 (2000) (arguing in favor of constitutional reforms of the WTO to
promote civil society and human rights). See also Pietro Maffettone, The WTO and the
Limits of Distributive Justice, 35 PHIL. Soc. CRITICISM 243 (2009) (positing a critical

perspective that joining the WTO is not a "completely free policy choice").
71. See Sol Picciotto, Paradoxes of Regulating Corporate Capitalism: Property Rights
and Hyper-Regulation,1 OI4ATI Socio-LEGAL SERIES, no. 2, 2011, at 1, 15-16.
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organizations. 72 It also arises from a variety of contractual
arrangements and intertwining processes between organizations,
including states, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), that constitute regimes.73 Recalling Stephen Krasner's classical
definition of regime: "[riegimes can be defined as sets of implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures
around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of
international relations." 74
The emerging transnational constitutional law has a brand new
character: it consists of sets of rules and rules about rules that are
closely connected with specific forms of knowledge and specific
distributions of social power in different issue areas. Each regime seems
to develop its own constitutional law, which, for its part, relies on a
particularly technical vocabulary. Further, "each such vocabulary is
likely to highlight some solutions, some actors, some interests" to the
detriment of others.75
But what are the political implications of this shift? Which interests
does a specific regime highlight? If a decision of the WTO impairs the
chances and opportunities of a group of individuals of a particular
ethnic or cultural minority, is it possible for them to make political
claims to a parliament or to a constitutional court of last resort? If the
decision of an arbiter from a third country on a corporate dispute
between two corporations of two other countries jeopardizes the right to
choose and the economic freedom of some population in a fourth
country, to whom could this population appeal? Should the answers to
such problems be found only in the language of trade or competition
law? A "spontaneous constitutionalization"of transnational processes of
legalization that is based on the increasing autonomy of functional
social sectors does not imply a "depoliticization of society."7 6 These are
increasingly pressing questions that today's legal and political theory
must face.

72. See Tilrkiller Isiksel, On Europe's Functional Constitutionalism: Towards a
Constitutional Theory of Specialized InternationalRegimes, 19 CONSTELLATIONS 102, 106
(2012) (defining "functional constitutionalism" as the creation and organization of public
power through a constitution which translates normative expectations built into that
constitution into "government").
73. See TEUBNER, supranote 7, at 59-72.
74. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 185, 186 (1982).
75. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of InternationalLaw - 20 Years Later, 20 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 7, 11 (2009).
76. See TEUBNER, supra note 7, at 117-19.
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III. THE POLITICS OF LAW: THE "POLITICAL" OF TRANSNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM

If we think about sensitive issues of today's international politics,
such as genetically modified organisms, and consider the social,
environmental, and economic consequences arising from them, a
difficult question immediately arises: "What vocabulary would serve
best to grasp [this] novel phenomenon?"7 7 Should we use the vocabulary
of economics or environmental regimes? Should we use the language of
human rights or the language of trade? A lot depends on this choice,
because once we know which vocabulary will be used, we already have
an idea of how it will be dealt with.78 As soon as a social problem has
been ascribed to a specific regime, it becomes a matter of knowledge and
science rather than a matter of politics. To this extent, transnational
constitutionalism is not based on constitutional arrangements
underpinned exclusively by traditional political institutions, such as
nation states and their associations.
In fact, issue regimes, usually dominated by highly specialized
epistemic communities, 79 increasingly dominate policymaking and law
at the transnational level. This fact is also reflected in the management
of legal decisionmaking in global governance regimes, which have
become the focus for experts in specific regulatory areas. Global
governance refers increasingly to the provision of optimal benefits for
the respective stakeholders of a specific specialized social sector.8 o Social
problems are therefore described according to a new vocabulary, which
is very different from the vocabulary used in the context of democratic
political constitutionalism. Rather, the language of governance regimes
is based on the cognitive language of indicators and disciplinary
measurements, making possible more neutral and technocratic
decisionmaking. The proliferation of indicators becomes an important
tool not only for public policy and corporate governance, but also for
legal decisionmaking.81 Moreover, smart governance legitimates itself
more on the basis of information management than on political
agreement. Global regulations can be silently enforced through

77. Koskenniemi, supra note 48, at 796.
78. See id. at 797.
79. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination,46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3-4 (1992).
80. See Martti Koskenniemi, Formalism, Fragmentation,Freedom:Kantian Themes in
Today's InternationalLaw, 4 No. FOUND. 7, 13-14 (2007).
81. See Koskenniemi, supra note 52, at 4; Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World:
Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
(SUPPLEMENT 3) 83, 83 (2011).
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standards and rankings, and legal decisions become almost impossible
to challenge on the basis of political arguments. 82
As a consequence of this shift, one could promptly ask: Where is
politics? Would the fragmentation of legal regimes and the technocratic
decisionmaking of global governance represent a depoliticization of
society?88 Would it still make sense to talk of politicization in the same
way as the structures of a contentious politics-"politics in which people
make concerted claims bearing on each other's interests" usually
addressed to states? 84 Would we not observe a post-democratic
transformation of world politics, suppressing the potential for
transformations arising from "political conflicts over interests?" 85 In the
place of a democratic vocabulary of constituent power, should we not
observe the emergence of a new vocabulary, mostly of technocratic
disciplines?
Some authors react to this point by taking a step back and engaging
in old-concepts politicization. Specifically, with regard to the legal
discipline, they point out that politicization is not an exclusive
phenomenon of the political system.86 Legal politicization, as well as
advances in legal methodology, could also come into play when one
thinks of mechanisms of representation and politicization of interests.
Actually, legal theory has been historically aware of the possibilities
for politicization within the law. Since the nineteenth century, legal
realism and the Free-Law School have claimed that it is impossible to
limit legal decision-making to an exclusively literal and neutral
interpretation. 87 In the first half of the twentieth century, Hans Kelsen
was also conscious of the fact that an ineluctable moment of creativity,
which always has some political content, must lie beyond the logical
structure of law, the actual object of study of legal science.88 Also, the
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) have been occupied in "deconstructing"
82. HELMUT WILLKE, SMART GOVERNANCE: GOVERNING THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE
SOCIETY 7-51 (2007). See also Winton Higgins & Kristina Tamm Hallstrdm,

Standardization, Globalization and Rationalities of Government, 14 ORG. 685, 686-87
(2007).
83. TEUBNER, supra note 7, at 114.
84. CHARLES TILLY, CONTENTION AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE: 1650-2000 6 (2004).
85. COLIN CROUCH, POST-DEMOCRACY 70-76 (2004).
86. See, e.g., TEUBNER, supra note 7, at 114-124.
87. KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENScHAFT [METHODOLOGICAL
THEORY OF THE LEGAL SCIENCES] 59-69 (1991) (Ger.); MORTON J. HORWTZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, 169-192 (1992).
88. KELSEN, supra note 6, at 353 ("The task to get from the statute the only correct
judicial decision or the only correct administrative act is basically the same as the task to
create the only correct statutes within the framework of the constitution. Just as one
cannot obtain by interpretation the only correct statutes from the constitution, so one
cannot obtain by interpretation the only correct judicial decisions from the statute.").
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legal formalism by showing that law always bears some form of
indeterminacy, which emerges in the very moment of legal
decisionmaking.89 CLS, by the way, made a long career in the legal
discipline, including international law.90 Drawing on this long tradition,
a broad array of scholars and legal practitioners have tried to develop
conceptual tools for understanding the role of politics within
transnational and global law.
In fact, on a national level, the high complexity of contemporary
societies has already demonstrated that legal questions cannot be
understood as a mere result of methodologically oriented, neutral legal
interpretation. As different authors have observed, the expansion of the
scope of state activities and responsibilities has resulted in the
emergence of "open-ended standards and general clauses in legislation,
administration and adjudication," which induced a "turn from
formalistic to purposive or policy-oriented styles of legal reasoning and
from concerns with formal justice to an interest in procedural and
substantive justice."91 As demonstrated by a long discussion over the
paradoxes of the regulatory state, the increased complexity of regulation
tended to always imply more regulation as a way to deal with the
increased complexity of social relations that emerged from the first
regulatory attempts. In the end, those who manage the regulatory
mechanisms and their judicial control should have discretion. And as it
has been argued in the context of the CLS, some internal politicization
would necessarily emerge as the consequence of indeterminacy. 92
It is exactly this tendency that seems to be more pronounced on the
transnational level, although under very different structural conditions,
since transnational law operates in the absence of many of the political
structures of national political systems. Therefore, the politics of
transnational constitutionalism does not assume the form of a political
struggle between political parties whose interests are directly, or even
advocatorily, involved in bargain or negotiation processes. Rather, the
politics of transnationallaw takes into account that "[i]t is impossible to
make substantive decisions within the law which would imply no

89. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Paradoxof American CriticalLegalism, 3 EUR. L.J.
359 (1997).
90. E.g., Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of InternationalLaw, 4 EUR. J. I'NTL L. 4

(1990).
91. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF
SOCIAL THEORY 194 (1976). See also Gunther Teubner & Bremen Firenze, Juridification:
Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL
WELFARE LAW 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987) (Ger.).
92. UNGER, supranote 91, at 192-200.
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political choice." 93 As long as any legal decision can be politicized, the
increasingly technocratic legalization of transnational law, be it within
lex mercatoria, within the lex digitalis of ICANN adjudication, or within
WTO, might also be seen as the object of processes of politicization.
Different authors have pled to a productive use of this discovery as a
source of hegemonic struggles over the legal frameworks' of
transnational and global decisionmaking. Instead of accepting the rule
of experts, whose power derives from their capacity to describe any
problem in the language of a specific technical regime, the task is
described as a hegemonic technique of exposing invisible forms of
domination. The scope of legal critique has changed: "If [twenty] years
ago it seemed intellectually necessary and political useful to
demonstrate the indeterminacy . . . [of the legal language] today's
critique will have to focus on the clash of different idioms . . . and

highlight the way their competing descriptions work to push forward
some actors or interests which leaving others in the shadows." 94
Martti Koskenniemi, for instance, who is known for applying the
CLS techniques to public international law, has tried in the last decade
to describe the politics of transnational law with another language. For
him, on this level, at stake is another kind of political struggle: "politics
of re-definition." 95 Accordingly, it would not be so important to occupy
the place of decision, but to decide over which language is to be used to
describe a specific problem and how that language articulates its
description.96 The vocabularies of respective issue areas, appealing to
neutral methods and scientific descriptions, would make it easier for a
specific group to universalize a particular description of reality as
reality itself. But reality can be described in very different ways
depending on which vocabulary is used. The same problem, or legal
dispute, can be described from the perspective of environmental sciences
or from economics. And as a result, one can arrive at very different
solutions. "To this extent the vocabularies act as 'ideologies' in the
technical sense of reifying, making seem necessary or neutral something
that is partial and contested"9 7
This increasingly ideological specialization of the vocabulary of
global governance would be grounded in a new perspective of the law,
which Koskenniemi calls a "managerial mind-set." This mind-set would
be the consequence of "'deformalization,' 'fragmentation' and 'empire'" in

93. Koskenniemi, supra note 90, at 31.
94. Koskenniemi, supra note 75, at 11.

95. Id. at 11.
96. Id. at 11-12.
97. Id. at 12.
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the realms of international and transnational law.98 By deformalization,
he understands "the process whereby the law retreats solely to the
provision of procedures or broadly formulated directives to experts"; by
fragmentation, "the splitting of law into functionally defined 'regimes"';
and by empire, he understands "the emergence of patterns of constraint
deliberately intended to advance the objectives of a single dominant
actor, either through the law of irrespective of it."99 The managerial
mind-set would gradually replace the legal language law used to have in
its politically constitutionalized form with functional dialects of
transnational regimes. As a consequence of this fact, in the language of
transnational law, government would become governance, responsibility
would become compliance, and disputes would gradually become
management problems. The managerial mind-set would become an
interesting "unreflective version of legal literalism," since it does not do
much more than interpret literal reality from the standpoint of its
technical description by specialized disciplines.100 The rule of experts is
necessarily biased, since it is structurally supported by the specialized
functional regime through which the world is disclosed. This form of
ruling is then described as being very similar to those of the European
Ancidn Regimes. "Ancidn rigimes, after all, were also regimes, and the
rule of law was imagined by Kant and other liberals against all that."101

Koskenniemi opposes the managerial mind-set from an antagonist
perspective, which is grounded in the tradition of political
constitutionalism. The "constitutional mind-set" corresponds to the
political tradition drawing back to the Kantian motive for the existence
of an internal legality of the law, where validity relies on its own
internal normativity. Accordingly, law should be seen as a normative
order in its own right, based on reason and on its self-legislative
capacity. 102 Following Kant's criticism of utilitarian reasoning and his
argument that freedom must be understood as self-determination,
Koskenniemi claims that "law is needed for legislation to exist, and
legislation is needed for self-determination to be possible."103 Thus, law
must be the expression of a community's self-determining will.
Against the managerial mind-set, the Kantian constitutional mindset considers everyone's political interests. Notwithstanding, if, for
Kant, the political dimension of law is ultimately limited by the moral
98.
99.
100.
101.

Koskenniemi, supra note 10, at 13.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 17.

102. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 49 (Allen W.

Wood ed., Allen W. Wood trans., 2002).
103. Koskenniemi, supra note 10, at 25.
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dimension of universalist reason, for Koskenniemi, (Kantian) moral
politics are nothing but a political option that every legal practitioner
has to make. Kantian moral politics becomes, thus, a political project,
which has to be affirmed in the face of other political projects. In the
special case of international law, it must be established against the
managerial mind-set of the deformalized
law of empire.
Constitutionalism is, therefore, understood as a political mind-set. The
task of today's politics of law is to pursue the affirmation of
constitutionalism as a collective project, which challenges the expert
rule. By this operation, however, the political project of Kantian
universalism becomes disconnected from the Kantian premise of
universal reason, effective in the institutional mechanisms of private
and public self-legislation. It becomes a political project among others,
struggling for hegemony over the "constitutional vocabulary" of global
and transnational law without depending on its structural conditions. 104
For those defending a politicization of law, without regard to its
political democratization through institutional and political reforms, the
central question of today's politics of law becomes the following: "what
kind of .

.

. law, and what type of (and whose) preference" determine

how social problems become legally framed?10 Nevertheless, the
redefinition of the managerial world in the constitutional language of a
"Kantian mind-set" or of public administrative law does not rely on the
"intrinsic worth of those vocabularies"; rather, it makes sense only for
the sake of "the critical challenge they pose to today's culture of apolitical expert rule."106 In other words, for Koskenniemi and for other
scholars following this kind of deconstructionist-Gramscian approach,
the Kantian mind-set of constitutionalism works as the basis for a
counter-hegemonic technique, which strives for control of the ruling
language within international law.
The struggle for the hegemony over the constitutional language of
international and global law could be defined, in a radical Gramscian
sense, as the struggle for defining as universal "a particular way of
10 7
living and thinking, a Weltanschauung."
Accordingly, struggles over
the hegemony of legal language normalize particular worldviews
through the formal language of law, offering them a link to
universalization and compatibility. Through this operation, a particular
legal hegemony will have the prerogative of "creat[ing] and
maintain[ing] a particular mode of coexistence and of individual
relations, . . . mak[ing] certain usages and modes of behaviour disappear
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id. at 35.
Koskenniemi, supranote 75, at 17.
Id.
Buckel & Fischer-Lescano, supranote 11, at 442.
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. disseminat[ing] others" by making certain usages and modes of

behavior disappear and disseminating others. 108 The constitutional
discourse articulating the language of law from within the legal system
itself would be at the very core of today's possibilities of politicizing
world society.
In a global system of governance that is mostly reproduced by
fragmented forms of transnational law, the language that articulates
meaning and controls the validity of legal norms at this level is a
defining
medium.
Within
the
language
of
transnational
constitutionalism, the particular worldviews of certain social groups and
functional sectors can be universalized and transformed into the ruling
form of life across the entire world society. These struggles thus become
the privileged point where anti-hegemonic techniques should take place
and politics of law should be carried out in an "emancipatory" way.
CONCLUSION
The attempts to describe alternative mechanisms of politicization in
transnational law are valid, but in many ways they are also limited.
Relying on the radical assumption that society can always be described
as a political object, the authors pursuing this thread of argumentation
seemingly fail to explain the circumstances under which political
struggles (also in the form of struggles over hegemony) might play an
important role in social evolution.
Certainly, political projects can influence the course of historical
developments as soon as they determine how decision making within
the law, but also in other social domains (such as art, science, and
sports), is carried out. However, it is hard to accept the claim that the
language of politics, and consequently the language of hegemonic
struggles, has always been available for social actors (and also for
political and legal theoreticians) in human history. In other words, the
very idea that anti-hegemonic techniques can be employed to change
dominant worldviews is not a given without further social conditions
making it possible. Also, such conditions surely need further sociological
specification if we want to understand how to politicize world law under
today's conditions of fragmentation and functional constitutionalization.
Hence, to understand how collective decision-making, and the
(collective) political projects it always implies, 109 can be the object of
social struggles, political and legal theory must understand which
108. Id. at 447.
109. See Armin Nassehi, Der Begriff des Politischen und die Doppelte Normativitit der
"Soziologischen"Moderne [THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL AND THE DOUBLE NORMATIVITY
OF THE "SOCIOLOGICAL" MODERNITY], 14 SOZIALE WELT 133 (2003) (Ger.).
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conditions must be present, making visible the possibility of striving for
the hegemony of forms of life and worldviews. That is to say that it has
to consist of an institutional political project.
In what follows, I would like to raise some questions about the
institutional and sociological conditions of the politicization of law.
Elsewhere, I have tried to reflect on this issue from the perspective of
sociological systems theory. 10 This time, I intend to draw on the
insightful thoughts of the political philosopher Claude Lefort. In order
to follow the same thread, my argument consists of the claim that the
politicization of law within the legal system is a very improbable
phenomenon that must rely on complex social structures and
institutions. My intuition is that, unless some of these structures-or
their functional equivalent-are present on a transnational level, the
politics of international law will remain limited to totalitarian forms
like those Martti Koskenniemi has described as imperial.
If Koskenniemi argues that the new global governance regimes
seem like new totalitarian "ancien rigimes" based on naturalistic
comprehensions of the law, he should also keep in mind that, under the
ancien rigime, citizens were not able to criticize the sovereign."' And
this was so not only because the "regime" was a totalitarian one, which
left no room for free expression and critique by its citizens, but also
because society disposed of no vocabulary to describe political and legal
decisionmaking as possible objects of politicization. In fact, under
traditional forms of society, not only is the political system prevented
from developing internal forms of social conflict, but also other social
spheres are usually integrated under a totalitarian ethical life, which
assigns very narrow predetermined social roles and positions for every
social group and individual in society. 112 Under the social organization
of ancien rigimes, individuals and groups of individuals were not able to
develop a self-understanding that enabled them to see themselves as
political actors.113 The law was also subjected to totalitarian forms of
organization, which made the law little more than a medium for the
reproduction of the structural hierarchies of society.11 4 Under these
110. See HOLMES, supra note 15, at 61-75.
111. See CHRIS THORNHILL, A SOCIOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONS: CONSTITUTIONS AND
STATE LEGITIMACY IN HISTORICAL-SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPEcTIVE 88-112 (2011).
112. NIKIAS LUHMANN, DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFT [THE SOCIETY OF THE
SOCIETY] 678-707 (1997) (Ger.).
113. See id. at 1016-1036. See also NIKLAS LUHMANN, Individuum, Individualitat,
Individualismus [Individual, Individuality, Individualism], in GESELLSCHAFTSSTRUKTUR
UND SEMANTIK. STUDIEN ZUR WISSENSSOZIOLOGIE DER MODERNEN GESELLSCHAFT BAND 3
[SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SEMANTICS: STUDIES ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE OF
MODERN SOCIETY VOLUME 3] 149, 208-215 (1993) (Ger.).
114. See HOLMES, supra note 15, at 81-88.

THE POLITICS OF LAW AND THE LAWS OF POLITICS

577

circumstances, legal decisionmaking was not the task of a differentiated
legal system subject only to its own logic. Hence, it was simply
impossible to conceive of a politics of law that could be carried out in the
form of struggles over the hegemony of a "constitutional language."
Ancien rigimes are normative orders that integrate every other social
ordeK: under the same natural or metaphysical semantics, which must
give meaning to social life. To some extent, it is not a hegemonic form of
domination; it is a total form of domination that leaves no place to
political contestation. The possibility of politicizing the law from within
depends, therefore, on some social condition. It depends on the social
differentiation of the legal systems of other social orders and on what
Claude Lefort called the moment of the political.115
For Claude Lefort, the moment of the political depends on a deepseated social transformation of society. 116 Traditional societies were,
until modernity, conceived as a social body in which politics, religion,
ethics, and science were unified. The process that set free the social
possibilities of observing and identifying social, political, and legal
contingencies-thus making possible the politicization of society and
also of law-had its roots exactly in the fragmentation of that unity.
This process of fragmentation began under the political order of the
ancient regime," 7 but it would have been stabilized only after an
institutional transformation that would have made possible a
proceduralization of political conflicts through the inclusion of
individuals in political processes.
For Lefort, the social unity jeopardizing the social visibility of
contingency under the rule of the ancien regime could be depicted as
Kantorowics' metaphor of "the two bodies of the King.""18 "The image of
the king's body as a double body, both mortal and immortal, individual
and collective, was initially underlined by the body of Christ.""19 In fact,
by the seventeenth century, this political unity had been substantially
weakened. "[N]ew models of sociability emerged as a result of the
growth of individualism" and following "the development of the state
administration, which tended to make the latter appear as an
115. Claude Lefort, The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism,in THE POLITICAL
FoRMs OF MODERN SOCIETY: BUREAUCRACY, DEMOCRACY, TOTALITARIANISM 292, 305
(Claude Lefort & John B. Thompson eds., 1986).
116. Id. at 302.
117. See Claude Lefort, The Question of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
THEORY 9 (David Macey trans., 1988). See also OLIVER MARCHART, POST-FOUNDATIONAL
POLITICAL THOUGHT: POLITICAL DIFFERENCE IN NANCY, LEFORT, BADIOU AND LACLAU 9091 (2007).
118. ERNST H. KANTOROWICS, THE KING'S Two BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
THEOLOGY 441-48 (1997).
119. Lefort, supranote 115, at 302.
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independent, impersonal entity."120 What Alexis Tocqueville called a
"democratic revolution"-and which represented an increasing
separation of the distinct logics of different social sectors such as law,
science, and politics-could not guarantee the formation of a democratic
political order.121 The consequence of that fact was that the possibilities
of politicization and contingency observation remained limited: "the
changes that occurred did not entirely eliminate the notion of the
kingdom as a unity, which was both organic and mystical, of which the
monarch was at the same time the body and the head."122
Hence, "the kingdom of unity" was not abolished immediately as a
consequence of modernization and individualization. Even the emerging
bourgeoisie, who had tried to eliminate the body of the king symbolically
and in reality through the decapitation of Louis XVI, had tried to
reestablish some sort of social unity. 123 Timeless and ahistorical ideals
like unlimited private property, the state sovereignty, culture, and
nation have served exactly this purpose, as they have aimed to find new
political orders based on social foundations that could not be the object
of political contestation.124
For Lefort, it is clear that the differentiation of politics, law, and
science can only be stabilized through an encompassing process of
the
legal
on
which
depends
political
democratization,
the
through
revolution
institutionalization of the democratic
125
way
be
the
only
This
would
constitutionalization of political rights.
through which modern society could keep the social locus of power
empty, hence avoiding any idea or social claim for power that could
replace the social place, which has been occupied by that lost unity
represented by the king's body. That is to say, avoiding the reemergence of "renewed" expressions of the ancient rigime.126 For Lefort,
it is this reciprocal relation between the emergence of a democratized
political system and the differentiation of an autonomous legal, which
makes the exercise of power to become subject to "procedures of
periodical redistributions," in the form of electoral contests. 127 As a
consequence, "the locus of power becomes an empty place," and
128
democratic politics can emerge as "an institutionalization of conflict."
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 302.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 304.
See Id. at 302-03.

125. MARCHART, supra note 117, at 91.
126. See Claude Lefort, Politics and Human Rights, in THE POLITICAL FORMS OF
MODERN SOCIETY: BUREAUCRACY, DEMOCRACY, TOTALITARIANISM, supranote 115, at 239.
127. Lefort, supra note 117, at 19.
128. Id.
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The legal system, on the other hand, can observe the emergence of
internal forms of contingency, which also allows for internal
politicization movements.
The process of political democratization depends, however, not only
on the constitutionalization of rights. In his studies about the
totalitarian phenomenon, Lefort goes further in his defense of the
process of democratization as the key for understanding the possibilities
of social differentiation and social politicization of different spheres of
society. By looking at how the visibility of social contingency would be
restricted under totalitarian regimes, he attempts to show how the very
possibility of the emergence of social conflicts must be institutionalized
if social contingency is to remain visible.129 He argues that
constitutional processes are necessary to legalize and institutionalize
conflicts as a permanent possibility and for the social contingency to
remain active. 130 Accordingly, societies living under totalitarian political
regimes, which do not dispose of legally regulated democratic processes
of conflicts, tend to observe an increasing de-differentiation process
between the social spheres of political power, law, and (even scientific)
truth, as they become reunified under the same totalitarian normative
order. And, thus, the social visibility of contingency in these different
spheres becomes more and more jeopardized.
If the legal system cannot rely on a stable "institutionalization of
conflicts," it becomes increasingly vulnerable to timeless conceptions of
unity, which can limit internal forms of politicization even if there are
sophisticated techniques of legal management and reasoning in place.
The totalitarian experiences from the twentieth century are rich with
examples of political forms of ruling that could barely be said to be
based on lawless regimes. In spite of that, it is clear that under these
regimes, the legal system has been exploited in the interest of political
rulers and has become predominately closed for internal forms of
politicization. According to Lefort, the law, under these contexts, has
very often been the object of social processes of materialization.31 As an
example of this phenomenon, he mentions the "law of life" of
Nazionalsozialismusand the "law of history" of the Soviet Union. 132
For Lefort, it appears that the democratic societal form of
organization is not limited to the political system. Rather, it implies an
institutionalization of conflict among society, with many consequences
129. Claude Lefort, Hannah Arendt and the Political, in DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
THEORY, supra note 117, at 51.

130. Lefort, supranote 117, at 18, 19.
131. See generally CLAUDE LEFORT, COMPLICATIONS: COMMUNISM AND THE DILEMMAS OF
DEMOCRACY

(2007).

132. Lefort, supranote 129, at 45, 48.
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in different social contexts. 133 The constitutionalization of human rights
and the institutionalization of conflict through electoral competition and
free universal suffrage enables not only the fragmentation of a unified
normative order of the ancient rigime, but also allows for a social
contingency in different sectors of society. 134 In political democracy,
social forms of hierarchy and arbitrary traditions become continuously
exposed to the possibility of critique not only within political
organizations, but also along different social functions and social
sectors.
As expressed by Lefort, the political constitutionalization becomes,
therefore, the essential condition that enables the social locus of power
to be kept empty. Only the democratization of the political system
through its constitutional form can set free the social visibility of
contingency, making possible the politicization of decisionmaking within
different social sectors, including the law. Therefore, Lefort seems to
understand the democratization of politics as a basic condition of the
most characteristic trait of modern society:
Once power ceases to manifest the principle which
generates and organizes a social body, once it ceases to
condense within its virtues deriving from transcendent
reason and justice, law and knowledge assert themselves
as separate from and irreducible to power. And just as
the figure of power proves to be bound with the
temporality of its reproduction and to be subordinated to
the conflict of collective wills, so the autonomy of law is
bound up with the impossibility of establishing its
essence. As power, law and knowledge becomes
disentangled, a new relation to the real is established; to
be more accurate, this relation guaranteed within the
limits of networks of socialization and of specific
domains of activity. Economic, technical scientific,
pedagogic and medical facts, for example, tend to be
asserted and to be defined under the aegis of knowledge
and in accordance with norms that are specific to
them. 135
Democratic politics becomes the central condition for the very
possibility of any politicization of law, as it makes possible the visibility

133. See MARCHART, supranote 117, at 91.
134. See Lefort, supra note 117, at 19.
135. See id. at 18.
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of contingency within the system. For Lefort, there is a double
inscription of the political in society as soon as a democratic
constitutionalization of politics takes place. The political system
"represents within society its own forgotten foundation, its genesis in a
violent, abyssal act . . . politics as sub-system represents the Political

(subject) for all other social sub-systems."13 6 Once the differentiation of
politics has been made possible, it is possible for other systems to
organize internal forms of politicization in their own language.
If we think of the assumptions being brought about by the
constitutional reflections on transnational law, we will notice that those
assumptions clearly tend to treat legal politicization to some extent as
an ahistorical, asocial, and unconditioned phenomenon that
accompanies any legal regime. To this extent, Lefort's lessons can be
very useful in explaining transnational constitutionalism. If the nationstate, and thus the constitutional form of politics, loses its force as the
sole source of legal production and, as a consequence, the political,
constitutional form of law cannot be deemed to be subject to the same
structural conditions it used to be under democratic constitutionalism, it
might also be the case that the internal visibility of the contingency of
legal decisionmaking may become gradually lost or jeopardized. To this
extent, it makes thorough sense, if Martti Koskenniemi speaks of the
emergence of a "new" ancient regime of fragmented functional legal
regimes, dominated by the rule of experts. In fact, it is not outside the
description of a new sort of absolutism, namely in the form of
deterritorialized regimes, based on the fragmented rule of disciplinary
truth and carried out by technical institutions.
The political struggles being carried out in transnational law should
be, however, the object of more theorization. To simply rely on the
assumption that the most important task of critical legal thought, today,
would consist of employing counter-hegemonic techniques against the
growing rule of experts can be in many ways misleading. It is hard to
believe that the political struggles in transnational governance can be
conceived only as "politics of redefinition." The struggles over the
hegemony of the language of transnational law cannot take for granted
that the fragmented regimes of transnational governance can be
politicized through the language of collective conflicts.
To this extent, Gunther Teubner seems to be right when he discards
the possibility of political struggles recovering the language of politics in
the functionally differentiated system of global governance. For him, it
136. SLAVOJ 2I2EK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY Do: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL
FACTOR 194 (1991). See also URS STAHELI, SINNZUSAMMENBROCHE: EINE DEKONSTRUKTIVE
LEKTURE VON NIKLAS LUHMANNS SYSTEMTHEORIE [BREAKDOWNS OF MEANING: A
DECONSTRUTIVIST READING OF NIKLAS LUHMAN'S SYSTEMS THEORY] 261 (2000) (Ger.).
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seems that any hope must rely solely on the conditions of these
fragmented legal systems for producing an internal responsivity toward
their environments in the language of their own specialized functions. 137
It means that there would be no place for a politicization of legal
decisionmaking based on the language of interests or the language of a
counter-hegemonic political project. Rather, it would be, for instance, a
problem of economics if the economic legal regimes are not able to deal
with the problems of increasing inequality and social exclusion. Only in
the language of economics, and according to its own language, could
such problems be faced. For Teubner, however, it is also not really clear,
if the functionally differentiated global legal system can develop the
necessary features to offer such internal responsivity.
If one looks at today's forms of governance at the global and
transnational levels, it is hard not to become pessimistic about the real
possibility of changing and politicizing their fragmented legal regimes.
On the other hand, if we reconstruct the social conditions of political
constitutionalization, as we did above drawing on Lefort's work, it must
be the case that the absence of a global state will necessarily imply the
de-differentiation of the law in some form of a deformalized and
fragmented order of management, which becomes an easy prey for
private interests that can speak the language of governance. Maybe, the
social struggles for the hegemony of the transnational legal language
should be described neither as a war between disciplines-where public
international law would play the role of the Universal as a "Kantian"
constitutionalmind-set against the Particular of the various managerial
mind-sets-nor as a struggle over the constitutional language of
transnational law. Rather, it could be the case that the best description
of a new politics of transnational law is one that reflects the necessity of
its democratization. As Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Sonja Buckel
paradoxically show, the political struggles in world law must link the
legal language with the legally creative social movements that are the
only force that can force transnational law to accept new forms of
political inclusion.138 This should not be conceived, however, as a
struggle for the universalization of some "aesthetical judgement" that
could universalize particular forms of suffering as if they were to be felt
collectively. Even though it sounds philosophically possible, the
aesthetical language needed can only emerge and be effective under
highly selective conditions: the very idea of a free and universal
comprehension of aesthetical beauty also has its roots in modern
differentiation of free artistic expression, which must also be based on

137. See TEUBNER, supranote 7, at 117-23.
138. See Buckel & Fischer-Lescano, supra note 11, at 450-52.
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constitutional and inclusive rights. Instead of insisting on such
heterodox and abstract assumptions of an ahistorical politicization of
society, legal theory should go back to the institutional level where
legal
the
and
politics,
participatory
inclusion,
political
institutionalization of social conflicts can find its material basis. This is
the lesson that can be drawn from Lefort and from other theoretical
approaches.
The politics of transnational law would only make sense if it was
focused on the institutional level of democratic constitutionalization.
Since it is very improbable that we can come back to the institutional
form of democracy we witnessed in the nation state, it is clear that one
of the most important practical and theoretical questions of our day
consists of whether is it possible for the transnationalized world society
to develop functional equivalents of the political constitution on the
transnational level.' 39 A transnational democracy would surely be
different from a national one. It must, however, be able to include vast
sectors of society in procedural forms of decisionmaking that could be
subject to extremely politicized forms of social conflict and critique.

139. HAUKE BRUNKHORST, SOLIDARITY: FROM CIVIc FRIENDSHIP TO A GLOBAL LEGAL
COMMUNITY 151-61 (Jeffrey Flynn trans., 2005).

